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This paper continues Dietrich and List’s [2010] work on propositional-
attitude aggregation theory, which is a generalised uni￿cation of the
judgment-aggregation and probabilistic opinion-pooling literatures. We
￿rst propose an algebraic framework for an analysis of (many-valued)
propositional-attitude aggregation problems. Then we shall show
that systematic propositional-attitude aggregators can be viewed as
homomorphisms in the category of C.C. Chang’s [1958] MV-algebras.
Since the 2-element Boolean algebra as well as the real unit interval can be
endowed with an MV-algebra structure, we obtain as natural corollaries
two famous theorems: Arrow’s theorem for judgment aggregation as well
as McConway’s [1981] characterisation of linear opinion pools.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Dietrich and List [2010] have proposed the fundamentals of a
general theory of aggregation, with the aim of creating a unified theory of
preference aggregation, judgment aggregation (cf. List and Puppe [2009]
for a survey), probabilistic opinion pooling and more general many-valued
aggregation problems. In a very general logical framework, Dietrich and
List [2010] have proved that for su￿cently complex aggregation problems,
all independent and Paretian aggregators are already systematic (a stronger
independence condition, known as Strong Setwise Property in the probabilistic
opinion pooling literature following McConway [1981]). In an earlier paper,
Dietrich and List [2008] had already shown that judgment aggregation can be
treated as a special case of generalised probabilistic opinion pooling and that in
this setting, Arrow’s dictatorial impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation
is a special case of a generalisation of McConway’s [1981] characterisation of
linear opinion pools.
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1So far, however, no characterisations of general systematic many-valued
propositional-attitude aggregators are known, nor has the case of in￿nite
electorates been treated as yet. The present paper attempts to ￿ll this gap: We
generalise the main idea in Herzberg [2010] and prove that systematic many-
valued propositional-attitude aggregators are homomorphisms in the category
of MV-algebras (for short: MV-homomorphisms) as de￿ned by C.C. Chang
[1958a]. For the special case of a ￿nite electorate, we obtain as natural corollaries
both Arrow’s dictatorial impossibility theorem for judgment aggregation and
McConway’s [1981] characterisation of linear opinion pools.
We should note at this point that the use of algebraic ￿ in particular, lattice-
theoretic and Boolean algebraic ￿ methods has a long tradition in preference
aggregation theory, cf. e.g. D.J. Brown [1974] and the monographs by Kim
and Roush [1980] or Aleskerov [1999].1 (A proof of Arrow’s [1963] impossibility
theorem using ultra￿lters was published by Fishburn even as early as 1970.)
Some authors have also employed ￿lters and ultra￿lters to establish impossibility
theorems in judgment aggregation (e.g. Daniºls [2006], Dietrich and Mongin
[2010] and Klamler and Eckert [2009]). Moreover, the relation between merging
of opinions and certain functional equations ￿ which often can be interpreted
as homomorphy relations! ￿ has long been recognised in the opinion pooling
literature (cf. e.g. AczØl, Kannapan, Ng and Wagner [1983] and AczØl [1989]).
Nevertheless, with the exception of the aforementioned paper (Herzberg [2010]),
the published literature does not contain any systematic approaches to tackle
general aggregation problems from an algebraic, lattice-theoretic perspective.
In this paper, we will ￿rst outline a formal framework for rather general
many-valued aggregation problems by means of the notion of an MV-algebra
(Section 2). We shall then list a number of assumptions, mainly generalisations
of standard Arrovian responsiveness axioms for the aggregation functions
(Section 3). Thereafter, we shall state a characterisation theorem for aggregators
as MV-algebra homomorphisms and derive two well-known corollaries from
judgment aggregation and probabilistic opinion pooling (Section 4); the proofs
can be found in an appendix. Possible extensions of our methodology are
discussed in the ￿nal Section 5.
2 Formal framework
In the following, we describe a formal model for the aggregation of many-valued
propositional attitudes. The electorate will be given by some (￿nite or in￿nite)
set N. In addition, a set of propositions X (agenda) in a su￿ciently expressive
language will be ￿xed, and the electorate as well as each individual will be
supposed to display a certain attitude towards each proposition in the agenda
(thus assigning a truth value). The set of possible attitudes or truth values will
be denoted M (and will be assumed to possess some additional structure, viz.
that of an MV-algebra). Thus, each individual expresses his or her attitudes
towards the elements of the agenda through a function from X to M, called
attitude function. Then the attitudes of all individuals can be captured by an
N-sequence of attitude functions (i.e. by a map from N to MX); such an N-
sequence will be called pro￿le. An aggregator is then simply a map from (a
suitable subset of the set of) the set of pro￿les to the set of attitude functions.
1I would like to thank Professor Bernard Monjardet at this point.
22.1 Agenda syntax
Let L be the language of many-valued propositional logic. In other words,
let L be the language whose symbols consist of countably many propositional
variables, a propositional constant 0 (falsehood), a binary operation ⊕ (strong
disjunction) and a unary operator ¬ (negation). The set of well-formed formulae
in this language shall be denoted L.
A number of standard abbreviations will be helpful. First, we de￿ne a new
propositional constant 1 (truth) by ¬0. Next, we de￿ne additional operations.
The operation of weak disjunction (denoted ∨) will be de￿ned via
∀p,q ∈ L p ∨ q = ¬(¬p ⊕ q) ⊕ q,
and strong conjunction (denoted ⊗) as well as weak conjunction (denoted ∧)
can then be de￿ned through De Morgan’s laws:
∀p,q ∈ L p ⊗ q = ¬(¬p ⊕ ¬q),
p ∧ q = ¬(¬p ∨ ¬q).
The implication operation (denoted →) can be de￿ned as
p → q = ¬p ⊕ q.
(In their original paper, ￿ukasiewicz and Tarski [1930] took ¬ and → as the
primitive logical symbols of their language.) ￿ukasiewicz logic is then given by
the provability relation `, given by modus ponens (i.e. for all p,q ∈ L and
S ⊆ L, if S ` p and S ` (p → q), then S ` q) and the following axiom schemes:
For all p,q ∈ L,
A1. For all p,q ∈ L, the proposition p → (q → p) is an axiom.
A2. For all p,q ∈ L, the proposition (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)) is an
axiom.
A3. For all p,q ∈ L, the proposition ((p → q) → q) → ((q → p) → p) is an
axiom.
A4. For all p,q ∈ L, the proposition (¬p → ¬q) → (q → p) is an axiom.
(Cf. Rose and Rosser [1958] and Chang [1958b].)
One can de￿ne a relation ≡, called provable equivalence, on L by saying that
p is provably equivalent to q (denoted p ≡ q) if and only if both ` (p → q) as
well as ` (q → p) (wherein ` p is, for all p ∈ L, shorthand for ? ` p). It is not
di￿cult to verify that ≡ is an equivalence relation on L. The set of equivalence
classes shall be denoted L/ ≡. Representative-wise, one can de￿ne the constant
0, the operator ¬ and the operation ⊕ on L/ ≡; again, it is not hard to prove
that these are well-de￿ned. Therefore, the operations ⊗,∨,∧,→ can be de￿ned
on L as well.
2.2 Agenda semantics
Recall that an MV-algebra M is a structure (M,⊕,¬,0) such that (M,⊕,0) is a
commutative monoid (i.e. ⊕ is a commutative and associative binary operation
on M with neutral element 0) and the following identities are satis￿ed for all
x,y ∈ M:
3• ¬¬x = x,
• x ⊕ 1 = 1,
• x ∨ y = y ∨ x,
wherein 1 is shorthand for ¬0 and ∨ is de￿ned via
∀x,y ∈ M x ∨ y = ¬(¬x ⊕ y) ⊕ y.
It turns out that the structure (L/ ≡,⊕,¬,0), i.e. the set of equivalence
classes of provably equivalent formulae from many-valued propositional logic
with the canonical operations, is an MV-algebra, the so-called Lindenbaum
algebra for ￿ukasiewicz’s many-valued logic. This observation allows us to
take an algebraic approach to the semantics of many-valued propositional logic,
essentially due to C.C. Chang [1958a, 1959]: Let us henceforth assume that the
truth values form an MV-algebra; we shall hence ￿x an MV-algebra M for the
rest of this paper and shall refer to it as the set of truth values. Under these
hypotheses, an M-valuation can be de￿ned as an MV-algebra homomorphism
from L/ ≡ to M. If I is an M-valuation and p ∈ L, we shall usually simply
write I(p) instead of I([p]≡).
Important examples of MV-algebras are the following (cf. already Chang
[1958a]):
• Any Boolean algebra is an MV-algebra.
• If M = [0,1], the set of all real numbers between 0 and 1, one obtains
an MV-algebra with zero element 0 by setting ¬x = 1 − x and x ⊕ y =
min{x + y,1} for all x,y ∈ [0,1]. This is called the standard MV-algebra.
It is the set of truth values for the in￿nite-valued logic Li1.
• With the same de￿nitions for 0, ¬ and ⊕, the set M = [0,1] ∩ Q (the set
of all rational numbers between 0 and 1) is an MV-algebra; it is the set of
truth values for ￿ukasiewicz’s in￿nite-valued logic Lℵ0.
• Again with the same de￿nitions for 0, ¬ and ⊕, the set M =
{0,1/m,...,(m − 1)/m,1} is an MV-algebra for every positive integer m.
It is the set of truth values for ￿ukasiewicz’s (m + 1)-valued logic Lm+1.
Rose and Rosser [1958] and Chang [1959] have shown, each by a di￿erent
method, the completeness of Lℵ0.
2.3 Attitude functions
Consider a set X ⊆ L, henceforth called the agenda. Attitude functions are
functions from X to M. An attitude function A is rational if and only if it can
be extended to an M-valuation, i.e. there exists an M-valuation I such that
A(p) = I([p]≡) for all p ∈ X. Therefore, any rational attitude function A is also
well-de￿ned not only on X, but on the closure of X under ¬ and ⊕. A (rational)
pro￿le is an N-sequence of (rational) attitude functions. An attitude aggregator
is a map from a subset of the set of pro￿les to the set of attitude functions. An
attitude aggregator is a dictatorship if and only if there exists some i ∈ N such
that F(A) = Ai for all i ∈ N.
An important observation is the extendibility of rational attitude functions:
4Remark 1. Denote the closure of the agenda under ¬ and ⊕ by Y . Any rational
attitude function can be uniquely extended to a function from Y to M.
We shall always identify the extension of any rational attitude function A
with its extension to Y . Thus, in the following, all rational attitude functions
are assumed to be de￿ned on the whole of Y .
2.4 Examples
Examples for this framework are the ￿classical￿ propositional judgment
aggregation, where M is 2 = {0,1} endowed with the Boolean algebra structure,
or probabilistic opinion pooling, where M is the standard MV-algebra [0,1] and
the agenda corresponds to the σ-algebra of events. However, this framework also
encompasses aggregation problems with respect to more general many-valued
logics: All that is required is that the set of truth values forms an MV-algebra;
by that means, the framework proposed in this paper covers aggregation of
propositions in a large class of ￿nite- and in￿nite-valued logics as well. For
example, voting with abstentions can easily be modeled as an aggregation
problem in a three-valued logic, e.g. ￿ukasiewicz’s L3.
3 Aggregator responsiveness axioms
In this section, we generalise (mostly standard) terminology from aggregation
theory, in order to be able to formulate our subsequent results on propositional-
attitude aggregators. We shall use the abbrevation
A(p) = (Ai(p))i∈N




De￿nition 2. An attitude aggregator F is rational if and only if for all rational
pro￿les A in the domain of F, F(A) is a rational attitude function.
De￿nition 3. An attitude aggregator F is universal if and only if its domain
comprises all rational pro￿les.
Independent aggregation means that the aggregate attitude towards any
proposition p does not depend on the individuals’ attitudes towards propositions
other than p:
De￿nition 4. An attitude aggregator F is independent if and only if there
exists a map G : MN × X → M such that for all pro￿les A in the domain of F
and for all p ∈ X, F(A)(p) = G(A(p),p).
Systematic aggregation is a special case of independent aggregation, where
G is constant in the second component, i.e. the aggregate attitude towards any
proposition p only depends on p through the individuals’ attitudes towards p:
De￿nition 5. An attitude aggregator F is systematic if and only if there exists
a map f : MN → M, called decision criterion of F, such that for all pro￿les A
in the domain of F and for all p ∈ X,
F(A)(p) = f (A(p)). (1)
5Remark 6. If the agenda contains some strictly contingent sentence p0, then
any universal systematic attitude aggregator F has a unique decision criterion.
Though it appears much stronger at ￿rst sight, systematicity is under mild
conditions actually equivalent to independence (cf. Dietrich and List [2010,
Theorem 2]). At least as strong is the following notion (recall that rational
attitude functions can be uniquely extended to the closure of the agenda under
¬ and ⊕):
De￿nition 7. A systematic attitude aggregator F is strongly systematic if and
only if Equation (1) holds even for all p in the closure of X under ¬ and ⊕ and
all pro￿les A in the domain of F.
If the agenda is closed under ¬ and ⊕, then systematicity and strong
systematicity trivially coincide.
The Pareto principle asserts that any proposition which is rejected
unanimously by all individuals, must be collectively rejected:
De￿nition 8. An attitude aggregator F is Paretian if and only if for all pro￿les
A in the domain of F and all p ∈ X, if Ai(p) = 0 for all i ∈ N (i.e. A(p) = 0),
then F(A)(p) = 0.
A formula p ∈ L is called strictly contingent if and only if there exists for all
x ∈ M some M-valuation I with I(p) = x. For most of the paper, we need to
impose additional assumptions on the logical expressivity or complexity of the
agenda.
De￿nition 9. The agenda X is called complex if and only if there exists a
strictly contingent propositions p0 in X as well as strictly contingent propositions
p1,p2,p3,q1,q2 in the closure of X under ¬ and ⊕ such that for all M-valuations
I, one has I(p1)⊕I(p2) = I(p3) and ¬I(q1) = I(q2). If p1,p2,p3,q1,q2 are even
in X, then X is said to be rich.
Any conceivable combination of truth values can be obtained through M-
valuations of elements of rich agendas, hence their name. This will be the
key to the proof of our main result, via the notion of strongly systematisable
aggregators:
De￿nition 10. In this paper, a systematic attitude aggregator F for a complex
agenda X is called strongly systematisable if and only if F is either strongly
systematic or the agenda X is rich.
4 Results
Note that MN is ￿ as the direct product of card(N) identical copies of M ￿
again an MV-algebra; the strong disjunction ⊕N and negation ¬N are de￿ned
componentwise, the zero element 0N is just the N-sequence 0 of 0’s.
Theorem 11. If F is a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly systematisable
attitude aggregator, then the decision criterion of F is an MV-homomorphism.
Conversely, if f is an MV-homomorphism and F is de￿ned by Equation (1)
for all rational pro￿les A and all p ∈ X, then F is a rational, universal, Paretian
and systematic attitude aggregator.
6(The uniqueness of the decision criterion had already been noted in
Remark 6.)
If M = {0,1} with the usual Boolean structure, then MN is again a Boolean
algebra and isomorphic to the power-set Boolean algebra of N. This allows us
to deduce, as an easy corollary to Theorem 11, the recent result in Herzberg
[2010]. Ultimately, this leads to Arrow’s impossibility theorem for judgment
aggregation (recall the previous remark about the equivalence of systematicity
and independence under mild conditions).
Corollary 12. Suppose F is a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly
systematisable attitude aggregator. If the algebra of truth values is Boolean,
then the decision criterion of F is a Boolean homomorphism.
If the algebra of truth values is just the Boolean algebra {0,1} and the
electorate N is ￿nite, then F is a dictatorship.
If M is the standard MV-algebra, then Theorem 11 yields McConway’s
[1981] characterisation of linear opinion pools (￿weighted averaging￿) as a second
corollary:
Corollary 13. Let F be a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly
systematisable aggregator, and let the algebra of truth values be the standard
MV-algebra [0,1]. If the electorate N is ￿nite, then the decision criterion of F
is a linear map from [0,1]N to [0,1].
5 Discussion
We have seen that one can neatly formulate an aggregation theory for general
many-valued propositional attitudes based on the theory of MV-algebras.
Aggregators satisfying common responsiveness axioms (agenda complexity
resp. richness, collective rationality, universality, systematicity resp. strong
systematicity, Pareto principle) then simply correspond to MV-homomorphisms
from MN to M (M being the MV-algebra of truth values). For special cases
of M, one can use classical classi￿cation results for such homomorphisms to
obtain a classi￿cation of Paretian systematic aggregators, e.g. if M is the
Boolean algebra 2 = {0,1} (which leads to the judgment-aggregation analogue of
Arrow’s [1963] impossibility theorem, cf. Dietrich and List [2007]) or M = [0,1]
(which entails McConway’s [1981] characterisation of linear opinion pooling).
More general aggregator classi￿cations might be derived from MV-algebra
classi￿cations (cf. Chang [1959], Mundici [1986], Cignoli and Mundici [1997]).
This algebraic approach to aggregation theory could be taken further by
taking Heyting algebras or BL-algebras as sets of truth values. By that means,
aggregation of intuitionistic resp. fuzzy propositional attitudes could be studied
in full generality.
A powerful alternative to algebraic aggregation theory is the model-theoretic
approach pioneered by Lauwers and Van Liedekerke [1995], as it allows to study
aggregation problems for predicate logic in a natural manner as well. It remains
to be seen whether even many-valued aggregation problems can be studied by
model-theoretic methods; such an approach could pave the way for a systematic
analysis of aggregation problems in many-valued predicate logic. The algebraic
approach to many-valued model theory proposed by Zlato† [1981] might be a
￿rst starting point for such an endeavour.
7A Proofs
Proof of Remark 1. Let A be a rational attitude function. Consider any two
M-valuations I,I0 such that A(p) = I(p) = I0(p) for all p ∈ X or, more
precisely, A(p) = I([p]≡) = I0([p]≡) for all p ∈ X. In other words, I and
I0 are homomorphisms from L/ ≡ to M which agree on the set [X]≡ of ≡-
equivalence classes of elements of X. Thus, they must agree on the closure of
[X]≡ under the operations ¬ and ⊕ in L/ ≡. Call this closure [Y ]≡. Since the
operations ¬ and ⊕ in L/ ≡ are de￿ned representative-wise, [Y ]≡ equals the set
of equivalence classes of elements of Y (the closure of X under the operations
¬ and ⊕ in L). It follows that I([p]≡) = I0([p]≡) for all p ∈ Y .
Proof of Remark 6. Let p0 be as in the statement of Remark 6, let f and f0
be decision criteria of F, and let x = (xi)i∈N ∈ MN. Then there exists for
each i ∈ N some M-valuation Ii such that Ii(p0) = xi. Now each Ii induces a
rational attitude function Ai de￿ned by Ai(p) = Ii(p) for all p ∈ X, so that in
particular Ai(p0) = xi for all i ∈ M. As F is universal, the pro￿le A = (Ai)i∈N
is in the domain of F. Hence
f(x) = f (A(p0)) = F(A)(p0) = f0 (A(p0)) = f0(x).
Proof of Theorem 11. Let F be a rational, universal, Paretian and strongly
systematisable attitude aggregator, and let f be the decision criterion of F.
Consider any two elements of MN, x = (xi)i∈N and y = (yi)i∈N. Let
p1,p2,p3,q1,q2 be as in the de￿nition of agenda complexity. Then on the one
hand, since p1,p2,p3,q1,q2 are strictly contingent by assumption, there exists
for each i ∈ N some M-valuations Ii,I0
i,I00
i such that




i (p1) = 0.
On the other hand, since p1,p2,p3,q1,q2 were assumed to be as in the de￿nition
of agenda complexity, it follows for each i ∈ N,
• not only Ii(p1) = xi and Ii(p2) = yi, but also Ii(p3) = xi ⊕ yi and
I(p3) = I(p1) ⊕ I(p2) for every M-valuation I,
• not only I0
i(q1) = xi, but also I0
i(q2) = ¬xi and I0(q2) = ¬I0(q1) for every
M-valuation I0,
• I00
i (p1) = 0.
In other words, there exists an N-sequence I = (Ii)i∈N of M-valuations such
that
• I(p1) = x, I(p2) = y, I(p3) = x ⊕N y and I(p3) = I(p1) ⊕ I(p2) for every
M-valuation I,
• I
0(q1) = x, I
0(q2) = ¬Nx and I0(q2) = ¬I0(q1) for every M-valuation I0,
8• I
00(p1) = 0 = 0N.
Next note that by restricting each Ii, I0
i and I00
i to the set of equivalence classes
of elements of X (recall that I(p) is shorthand for I([p]≡) for any M-valuation I
and any p ∈ L), one obtains rational attitude functions Ai, A0
i and A00
i . All Ai,
A0
i and A00
i are rational attitude functions and thus can be uniquely extended





i )i∈N such that
• A(p1) = x, A(p2) = y, A(p3) = x ⊕N y, and I(p3) = I(p1) ⊕ I(p2) for
every M-valuation I,
• A
0(q1) = x, A
0(q2) = ¬Nx, and I0(q2) = ¬I0(q1) for every M-valuation I0,
• A
00(p1) = 0N.
Note that since F is universal, the pro￿les A,A
0,A
00 must be in the domain of
F. Since F is rational, F(A), F(A
0) and F(A
00) are rational attitude functions
and thus can be uniquely extended to Y by Remark 1. Moreover, there exist
M-valuations I and I0 such that F(A)(p) = I(p) as well as F(A
0)(p) = I0(p) for
all p ∈ X and hence, by the homomorphy of I, also for all p ∈ Y . From here, it
follows that




Let us next exploit the choice of p1,p2,p3,q1,q2 as in the de￿nition of agenda
complexity and the strong systematicity of F or the richness of X. This yields
for any M-valuation I which extends F(A),
f(x ⊕N y) = f (A(p3)) = I(p3)
= I(p1) ⊕ I(p2) = f (A(p1)) ⊕ f (A(p2)) = f(x) ⊕ f(y).
Similarly (this time applying the formulae in the de￿nition of agenda complexity














Thus, f preserves the operators ¬ and ⊕ and maps the zero element 0N of MN
to 0 ∈ M; hence, f is an MV-homomorphism.
Conversely, let f be an MV-homomorphism. Clearly, the F de￿ned by
Equation (1) for all rational pro￿les A and all p ∈ X is both systematic and
universal. Moreover, since f is a homomorphism, any composition of f with an
N-sequence of MV homomorphisms from L to M will again be a homomorphism
from L to M. In other words, the composition of f with an N-sequence of
valuations is again a valuation. This shows that the composition of f with a
rational pro￿le is a rational attitude function. Hence, the F de￿ned by Equation
(1) is rational. Since f(0N) = f(0) = 0, it is clear that F is Paretian.
Proof of Corollary 12. If M is even a Boolean algebra, then so is MN. By
Theorem 11, the decision criterion f is an MV-homomorphism. Since any
9MV-homomorphism between two Boolean algebras is a Boolean homomorphism
(because the Boolean operations ∨ and ∧ as well as the constant 1 can be de￿ned
through ¬ and ⊕: x ∨ y = ¬(¬x ⊕ y) ⊕ y and x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y) for all x,y
and 1 = ¬0), it follows that f is actually a Boolean homomorphism. Boolean
algebra teaches that the shell of f, i.e. f−1{1} = f−1{¬0}, is a ￿lter in 2N
(which is isomorphic to the power-set Boolean algebra of N), and if M = {0,1},
then the shell of f is even an ultra￿lter on N. Now if N is ￿nite, this means
￿ as all ultra￿lters on ￿nite sets are principal ￿ that there exists some i0 ∈ N
such that f−1{1} = {C ⊆ N : i0 ∈ C}. This, however, implies that F is a
dictatorship, the dictator being i0.
Proof of Corollary 13. Without loss of generality, we may assume N =
{1,...,n} for some positive integer n. By Theorem 11, the decision criterion
f : [0,1]N → [0,1] is an MV-homomorphism. This implies, if M is the standard
MV-algebra [0,1], that
f (x1,...,xn) ⊕ f (y1,...,yn) = f (x1 ⊕ y1,...,xn ⊕ yn)
for all x1,y1,...,xn,yn ∈ [0,1]. Hence (by the de￿nition of ⊕ in the ￿ukasiewicz
algebra, i.e. x ⊕ y = min{x + y,1} for all x,y ∈ [0,1] and the componentwise
de￿nition of ⊕ in the direct power [0,1]N) one has for all x1,y1,...,xn,yn ∈ [0,1]
with xi + yi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N,
f (x1,...,xn) + f (y1,...,yn) = f (x1 + y1,...,xn + yn). (2)
One can now emulate McConway’s [1981] original argument: An iterated
application of the preceding equation yields for all z1,...,zn ∈ [0,1],
f (z1,...,zn) = f (z1,0,...,0) + f (0,z2,...,zn)






























for all z1,...,zn ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, Equation (2) also implies fi(x + y) =
fi(x) + fi(y) for all x,y ∈ [0,1] with x + y ≤ 1 and each i ∈ N. Therefore,
every fi satis￿es Cauchy’s functional equation. Also, the range of every fi is
by de￿nition contained in the range of f and thus in [0,1], whence fi(x) is
nonnegative for all x ∈ [0,1] and every i ∈ N. Therefore, there exists for
every i ∈ N some αi such that fi(x) = αix for all x ∈ [0,1] (cf. AczØl [1961,
1966, Section 2.1.1, Theorem 1]), and this αi must be nonnegative. Thus,
f (z1,...,zn) =
Pn
i=1 αizi for all z1,...,zn ∈ [0,1].
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